Method in Moral Psychology by Fischer, Jeremy
“Moral psychology” is a recently-invented term of art with a somewhat
disputed reference, which reflects disagreement about its proper
method(s).1 Some use the term to designate venerable philosophical
inquiry into the nature and moral significance of psychological states.
These inquiries are carried out through armchair reflection based in
common sense, everyday observation, or intuition about, for instance,
what moral responsibility is and whether it requires volitional activity;
what emotions are and when, if ever, they are appropriate; and (the old
holy grail of ethics) what happiness is and whether ethical virtue always
delivers it. The Socratic paradoxes—such as that virtue is knowledge, that
weakness of the will is impossible, that a good person cannot be harmed
—comprise perhaps the earliest recorded instances of this style of moral
psychology in European philosophy.
Some recent practitioners—dissatisfied with the impoverished results of
what we might call reflective moral psychology—have instead carried out
their inquiries largely through humanistic study, using historical, literary,
and sociological results and the interpretative methods of those
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disciplines. We may call this humanistic moral psychology. In this category
we find Bernard Williams’s use of Sophocles’s Ajax to provide an account
of shame and moral incapacity,2 Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of
Aeschylus’s Oresteia in service of her accounts of anger and forgiveness,3
Gabriele Taylor’s analysis of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus in her monograph
on vice,4 and Charles Mills’s study of John Hearne’s Voices Under the
Window5 in aid of his analysis of the phenomenology of race and class, all
of which make use of hermeneutical and analogical reasoning to help
illuminate moral experience via these artworks.
Still other philosophers use “moral psychology” to refer to the scientific
study of the determinants of well-being and moral life, often aiming to
validate or falsify the presuppositions of reflective and humanistic moral
psychology. The spectacular advances of the last fifty years in the
cognitive and behavioral sciences fuel this work, which we might call
experimental moral psychology. There is also ample historical precedent for
it in the work of Hobbes, Hume, and Dewey, who all introduce
experimental methods of reasoning into moral philosophy. Proponents of
experimental moral psychology often can be found enlivening the
question-and-answer period of reflective and humanistic conference
presentations with pointed questions about the empirical adequacy of
various assumptions. (After one recent talk of mine on the topic of
emotional self-knowledge, a prominent proponent of this methodology
raised his hand to ask, simply, “You know that your conclusion
contradicts the science on this matter, right?”)
These approaches are, on the whole, largely complementary. Nussbaum’s 2
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work on emotion, for example, appeals alternatingly to Aeschylus and to
neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux. Likewise, Nietzsche combines literary and
historical reflection on Greek tragedy, Christianity, and Wagner with
appeals to contemporary (nineteenth-century) psychology, physiology,
and race theory (though he rejects certain tendencies of British empirical
psychology).
Alfano’s introductory text for advanced undergraduate students brings
experimental moral psychology into the classroom. It has many virtues.
For example, it sketches solutions to numerous controversies in the field,
including: (1) whether empirical findings about the indeterminacy and
instability of preferences undermine assessments of rightness and well-
being, (2) whether findings in neuroscience related to the “dual-process
theory” of cognition undermine assessments of rightness that depend on
the doctrine of double effect, (3) whether “situationist” findings in social
psychology undermine character-based assessments of moral worth and
rightness, and (4) whether anthropological findings about the extent of
ethical disagreement undermine some versions of moral realism. It also
serves as an excellent annotated bibliography of recent experimental
moral psychology.
Alfano insists, and I agree, that interdisciplinary confrontation is
necessary for doing moral psychology well, since “moral philosophy
without psychological content is empty, whereas psychological
investigation without philosophical insight is blind” (1). From where
should moral philosophers source our psychological content? One
answer, which we might call the broad experimental view, prioritizes
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equally the results of all relevant natural and social sciences, including
sociology, criminology, anthropology, archaeology, and linguistics. Even
though Alfano does not discuss most of these fields—and it would be
practically impossible for any short introductory text to do so—he
mentions all of them, at least in passing, in a way that makes clear that he
endorses broad experimentalism. Elsewhere Alfano has outlined a
research program that is “naturalistic” in the sense that it aims to “employ
only methods consonant with those used in the [‘hard’ and ‘soft’] sciences
and refer only to entities countenanced by the sciences.”6 Alternately, we
might accept a humanistic view, according to which one necessary
component of the psychological content needed for moral philosophy can
be acquired only by humanistic study. Such study involves making sense
of (for instance) our relation to the past, our aesthetic practices, and our
membership in political communities, where the project of sense-making
depends crucially—in ways that distinguish it from some scientific
projects—on our distinctive cultural, ethical, political, and aesthetic
experiences and values.
One point in favor of the humanistic view, it seems to me, is that the
study of moral psychology must attend to what our moral experience is
like, shaped as it is by our interpretations of that experience. Much moral
psychology aims to help us to make sense of our moral experience by
using interpretive methods proper to humanistic study, not merely to
diagnose the network of causes that make morality “work” (1) or not.
Alfano’s exclusion of humanistic moral psychology makes me wonder
about the place of such reflection in the work of experimental moral
psychologists. In their view, must we deny that humanistic reflection 2
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provides necessary psychological content to moral philosophy? Or must
humanistic reflection proceed by methods consonant with those of the
sciences?
I worry that by ignoring humanistic moral psychology, this introductory
text erases much interesting research in moral psychology in that it
encourages students to think that there’s nothing to see there. Perhaps
this is an inadvertent result of, say, marketing pressures from the
publisher. Alfano does suggest, though, that the text’s design is to offer “a
comprehensive survey of contemporary moral psychology” (ix). If so,
then Alfano has concealed from the introductory student the fruitful
pluralism of the field.
Perhaps Alfano will respond that the book doesn’t need to “give the other
side,” because it is the other side. Or perhaps Alfano denies that
humanistic moral psychology is intellectually reputable. I look forward to
his clarification on this matter.
Implicit Bias
Let’s consider one of the many stimulating discussions in Alfano’s text—a
discussion about blaming people for being implicitly biased that is
representative of the mix of empirical and conceptual claims offered in
the text. In anti-racist communities there has long been a suspicion, to say
the least, that even individuals who sincerely disavow racism might still
harbor racial bias. Recent empirical research seems to confirm this
suspicion, and there is a burgeoning philosophical literature about how to
understand moral responsibility for implicit bias, which Alfano ably
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highlights.7 How should we react to people with implicit biases who
sincerely avow a commitment to the moral and political equality of all?
There are numerous dimensions of analysis that are relevant to
answering this question, including (1) whether holding one responsible
would be useful (the pragmatic factors), (2) whether the biased person is in
a position to know about their bias (the epistemic factors), and (3) whether
the biased person is in a position to control their bias (the control factors).
Alfano discusses them all, but let us focus on the pragmatic factors.
Alfano presents the following argument that we should not think of
implicitly biased though explicitly egalitarian persons as racist or sexist.
Studies suggest that one’s self-conception is often self-confirming: if I
conceive of myself as a racist, say, then I am more likely to act like a racist
than I would otherwise be. Likewise, accusing others of racism risks
making them even more likely to act like a racist. Alfano takes these
claims to support what he calls “the factitious, interactionist framework”
(132) of virtue, according to which behavior is explained in terms of,
among other things, “the ongoing feedback between the individual and
environment” (187). On this view, social expectation-signaling and one’s
self-conception help to bring about and sustain dispositions to think, feel,
and act that are similar to traditional Aristotelian virtues or vices.
Therefore, conceiving of people as racist is “dangerous” (71). Instead,
Alfano suggests, perhaps one should think of such a person “as someone
who strives to be fair to targets of negative stereotypes but who suffers in
his human, all-too-human, way from various biases” (71). In doing so,
one would ascribe lack of ill will (or perhaps even good will) to the
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implicitly biased person, which might help to bring about personal
improvement. Lest one think that Alfano is urging emotional calm in the
face of injustice, he adds that there is reason for victims of implicit bias to
“angrily denounce people who are trying their best, despite implicit
biases. . . . Even if it ruffles a few feathers” (78). For implicit bias can cause
“immense harm” (78).
Several aspects of this argument would make for interesting classroom
debate. First, there is some tension between the claims that (a) we should
treat such implicitly biased people as if they have genuinely good will (or,
at least lack ill will) towards the targets of their bias and (b) we should
sometimes angrily denounce such people. For anger and blame are,
plausibly, responses to ill will. Pragmatic arguments to be angry in such
cases then seem to counsel emotional dishonesty or confusion. Perhaps,
as Nussbaum has recently argued, other emotional attitudes are both
more fitting and more productive (though perhaps not).8
Second, if even angry denunciation is compatible with constructive
efforts to improve the offender, then I see no reason why the same cannot
be said of calm and supportive communication that the offender
embodies some form of racism. Indeed, George Yancy has recently
hypothesized that bringing a person’s racism to their attention might be
crucial for facilitating improvement.9 Yancy urges well-intentioned
whites to consider themselves precisely as people who harbor racism
despite their anti-racist intentions, beliefs, and actions. He conceives of
such direct communication as a kind of gift, designed to help well-
intentioned whites escape from the racist lies and self-deceptions that
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cloud their minds. No doubt such a direct intervention requires tact and
perhaps even, as Yancy insists, a kind of love. So, on what empirical
grounds should we reject Yancy’s model of direct anti-racist (and anti-
sexist) intervention in favor of Alfano’s model?
This question leads to a third concern. It is not clear from the text what
empirical support, if any, there is for the claim that the relevant virtue of
justice is best characterized as factitious and interactionist. Alfano states
that there is some evidence that the virtues of tidiness, charity,
cooperativeness and competitiveness, helpfulness, eco-friendliness, and
scholastic motivation can be understood in this way. In general, though,
“we currently lack evidence one way or the other about which virtues”
(132) can be thought of in this interactionist way. So, it seems, we don’t
know whether the virtue of justice at issue is among those that can be
inculcated “by fine-tuning your self-concept and the social expectations
directed at you” (132). Given this lack evidence, the status of these
pragmatic claims about redressing bias is unclear. Does Alfano present
them as hypotheses or as justified by particular empirical research? I
worry that the reader will receive the false impression that it is a robust
finding that we should not call (merely) implicitly biased people “racist” or
“sexist,” and that such a reader will be motivated to adjust their behavior
in a problematic direction, for instance away from Yancy’s proposal,
because of an inadequately supported claim.
Alfano’s discussion of the pragmatics of blaming implicitly biased people
would make for stimulating classroom debate. That said, this text would
work best when supplemented by secondary literature that addresses
Alfano’s conceptual and empirical assumptions. To this end, Alfano
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helpfully provides suggested further readings at the end of each chapter.
With respect to the discussion about implicit bias, supplemental readings
might engage assumptions about the nature of good and ill will, the ethics
of expressing anger and blame, the nature of racism, and the empirical
status of Alfano’s interactionist theory of virtue.10
Thanks to Jeremy Fischer for his thought-provoking comments on Moral
Psychology: An Introduction. I welcome this opportunity to reflect on the
methodology of moral psychology.
Fischer distinguishes three methodologies in moral psychology, which he
dubs reflective, humanistic, and experimental. Each of these provides its
own perspective on the topic. Reflective moral psychology employs
armchair pondering of everyday experience, supplemented by common
sense. As Fischer notes, reflective moral psychology faces several
challenges, and we could easily add more challenges to his list. Which
everyday experiences should one reflect on, and why? How universal is
common sense? Whose experiences are liable to be ignored in this
4.10.18 | Mark Alfano
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process? If someone disagrees with you about a philosophical intuition,
does that mean at least one of you lacks common sense?
These are age-old questions, and they have rightly prompted
philosophers to seek a wider, more diverse range of experiences on which
to reflect and a process that is—in the ideal case, at least—reproducible
and intersubjectively valid. This leads us to humanistic and experimental
moral psychology. In the former, the range of experience is broadened by
going back in time to exemplary historical and literary cases, which
furnish rich portraits of people’s conduct and inner lives. In this
connection, Fischer points to examples such as Bernard Williams’s
interpretation of Ajax and Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of Oresteia.
By contrast, experimental moral psychology works with data to seek out
trends, identify effects both weak and strong, and construct causal or
computational models of moral psychological processes. Instead of
uncovering the deep meanings embedded in great historical and mythical
exemplars, experimental moral psychology aggregates and analyzes data
from ordinary human animals. Fischer questions whether this approach
is sufficient. Can an experimental moral psychology reveal everything
that a humanistic approach would illuminate? To get a firmer grip on this
question, it’s helpful to ask what, exactly, distinguishes the humanistic
approach. Fischer primarily associates it with interpretation or sense-
making. Science can tell us what there is and how it works, but
humanistic inquiry excels in telling us (or helping us tell ourselves) what
it means. I would add that, in engaging our imaginative capacities,
humanistic inquiry may also prompt us to consider possibilities and 2
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prospects that have hitherto remained unrealized. Reading Ursula K. Le
Guin’s stories, for example, is likely to lead to this phenomenon.
Because it can be hard to engage fully with the statistics, humanistic
inquiry can be uniquely instructive. Humanistic interpretation explores
stylized exemplars, even as it elides the full range of variance in people’s
psychologies. This has the advantage of focusing our attention on
particular cases that make various processes, experiences, and attitudes
salient. Just as it is often pedagogically, cognitively, or communicatively
helpful to do geometry with drawings on paper, chalkboards, or
computer screens, so it is often pedagogically, cognitively, or
communicatively helpful to do moral psychology with narratives from
books and film. As Andy Clark (2002) has argued, human minds operate
best when they are able to iteratively alternate between cognitive
processes such as deciding, inferring, and evaluating and perceptual and
agential processes such as seeing, feeling, and manipulating. Shifting back
and forth between the analysis of data and artistic or hermeneutical
representations of idealized types enables us to take advantages of both
our cognitive powers and our perceptual and storytelling capacities.
I hope that these irenic remarks go some way to reducing the distance
between Fischer and me. However, I don’t want to pretend that we agree
about everything, for I also see two substantial dangers in the kind of
humanistic moral psychology he enjoins. First, the range of exemplars on
which to reflect is liable to be at least as cramped as one’s own experience.
The store of literary and historical exemplars is almost laughably narrow.
In works of humanistic moral psychology, how often does one encounter
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exemplars who are not “the ancients,” characters in Jane Austen or
George Eliot novels, or Huckleberry Finn? If one of the deficiencies of
reflective moral psychology is that it does not draw on a sufficiently
diverse range of actual and possible experience, then humanistic moral
psychology is liable to exacerbate the problem. This is not essential to
humanistic moral psychology, but one is hard-pressed to find
counterexamples. Experimental moral psychology does better on this
score (if and only if it uses large and diverse samples of participants—a
desideratum that is sometimes neglected).
In addition to (typically) providing a worm’s-eye view of a very small
number of exemplars, humanistic moral psychology unconstrained by
data is prone to lead to misimagination. As Adam Morton (2006) points
out, it’s only possible to learn from our imaginings if they have the
possibility of being either correct or incorrect. Fictional, mythical, and
idealized historical exemplars are, in this context “an invitation to
illusion . . . because when we respond to fiction we react to the characters
in many of the ways we do to real people, and so if a way of reacting
makes sense with respect to a fiction we tend to think that it makes sense
with respect to real people.” As Morton goes on to argue, this can lead us
to think that the characters, motives, and experiences we attribute to
fictional characters are possible (perhaps even desirable) characters,
motives, and experiences in real life. It can also lead us to expect causal or
conceptual connections in real life that only exist in fiction.
To illustrate: Bernard Williams moves from shame in Sophocles’s Ajax to
shame in actual human communities. Martha Nussbaum moves from 2
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anger and forgiveness in Aeschylus’s Oresteia to anger and forgiveness in
real human encounters. Gabriele Taylor moves from vice in Coriolanus to
vice in everyday life. And Charles Mills moves from the experience of
class and race in Hearne’s Voices Under the Window to the experience of
class and race in contemporary society. We must ask, though: does shame
really work that way? Can real people forgive in the way Nussbaum
imagines forgiveness to work in the Oresteia? What is vice like for the
fancy apes that we are, and how similar is it to the vice of fictional
characters in Shakespeare’s plays? Do victims of our current racist and
classist society experience their own lives as Mills imagines the characters
in Hearne’s novel to experience them? Maybe. But then again, maybe not.
The only way to answer these questions is to employ the methods of
science. If my arguments here are on the right track, then humanistic
moral psychology may help us make sense of our experience, but it may
also help us make nonsense of it. That does not make humanistic moral
psychology useless. It does, though, show that the truth-values of the
insights it promises need to be corroborated by science. Or, as I put it in
the book, “moral philosophy without psychological content is empty,
whereas psychological investigation without philosophical insight is
blind.”
I turn now to Fischer’s remarks about bias and responsibility (about
which I have more to say in my responses to Trujillo and Radke). Fischer
points out that there is a prima facie tension between treating people who
embody implicit but not explicit bias as if they have good will, on the one
hand, and sometimes angrily denouncing them, on the other hand. I
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believe that this tension can be resolved by appealing to the distinction I
articulate in more detail in chapter 4 between ascriptions of traits (e.g.,
“You are such a sexist pig!”) and evaluations of actions (e.g., “That was a
sexist thing to do!”). The former, but not the latter, tend to function as
self-fulfilling prophecies. For this reason, it can be dangerous to accuse
other people of harboring biases (even if the accusation is correct), but it
is still perfectly possible to get angry and express that anger by calling out
bad behavior. Fischer rightly points out that the extant evidence for self-
fulfilling prophecies relates to ascriptions of traits other than being a
racist or being a sexist. So my tactical advice here and in the book is based
on the speculation that the same effect is liable to crop up in this context
as well. Further research could corroborate or falsify this speculation.
Further research could also shed light on whether my precautionary
advice is better tailored to the case than George Yancy’s suggestion.
I conclude by noting that all of this may turn out to be moot if the
implicit bias paradigm is overthrown. The implicit association test itself
may be unreliable and not useful for predicting behavior. I raised this
possibility in a tentative way on page 66 of Moral Psychology, but recent
research has made me even more worried (e.g., Forscher et al. 2017). If
implicit bias turns out not to exist or not to have a serious influence on
people’s conduct, then the conversation we need to have is not about the
unicorns who embody implicit-but-not-explicit bias, but about
individuals who harbor and express good old-fashioned explicit bias.
Indeed, we need to have that conversation no matter what.
  2
0
Shares
!
"
#
Moral Psychology - Syndicate https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/moral-psychology/
18 of 60 11/10/20, 7:09 PM
References
Alfano, M. 2016. Moral Psychology: An Introduction. Malden, MA: Polity.
Clark, A. 2002. “Towards a Science of the Bio-Technological Mind.”
International Journal of Cognition and Technology 1: 21–33.
Forscher, P., et al. 2017. “A Meta-Analysis of Change in Implicit Bias.”
Open Science Framework, October 5. Retrieved from osf.io/awz2p.
Morton, A. 2006. “Imagination and Mmisimagination.” In The Architecture
of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, edited by
S. Nichols. Clarendon.
Add your voice and join the discussion
Mark Alfano’s Moral Psychology: An Introduction palatably samples topics in
4.17.18 | G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
Response
The Backfire Effect and Political
Psychology
2
0
Shares
!
"
#
Moral Psychology - Syndicate https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/moral-psychology/
19 of 60 11/10/20, 7:09 PM
